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New York Breaks Gideon’s Promise 
 
By Rebecca King 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In 1963, the Supreme Court of the United States held that 
criminal defendants have the constitutional right to counsel, 
regardless of whether they can afford one, in the famous case of 
Gideon v. Wainwright.1  However, statistics, as well as public 
defense attorneys, reveal that the Supreme Court’s decision has 
yet to be fulfilled.  Part of the problem is due to the system of 
mass incarceration in the United States.  In 2013, the Brennan 
Center for Justice reported that the prison population reached 
2.3 million individuals, compared to the 217,000 inmates 
imprisoned when Gideon was decided.2  The American Bar 
Association estimates that between 60 to 90 percent of criminal 
defendants cannot afford a lawyer, and must rely on public 
criminal defense services.3 
Even though there has been an exceptional rate of 
criminalization and growth in the prison system population, 
funding for public defenders remains inadequate and meager 
compared to prosecution offices.  In 2007, the U.S. Bureau of 
Justice Statistics (BJS), determined that state and local public 
defender offices’ budgets were merely $2.3 billion, compared to 
prosecutor offices’ budgets that were approximately $5.8 billion.4  
 
1.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 336 (1963). 
2.  THOMAS GIOVANNI & ROOPAL PATEL, GIDEON AT 50: THREE REFORMS TO 
REVIVE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 3 (2013) (citing E. ANN 
CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2011 
and TODD D. MINTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 
2011 (2012).  
3.  MAREA BEEMAN, USING DATA TO SUSTAIN AND IMPROVE PUBLIC DEFENSE 
PROGRAMS 2 (2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba 
/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_sustaining_and_
improving_public_defense.authcheckdam.pdf. See also ROBERT L. 
SPANGENBERG ET AL., CONTRACTING FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST. BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE 3 n.1 (2000), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/181160.pdf.  
4.  GIOVANNI & PATEL, supra note 2 at 4 (citing STEVEN W. PERRY & DUREN 
BANKS, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2007 - STATISTICAL TABLES, U.S. DEP’T 
1
KING.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/18  3:08 PM 
2018 NEW YORK BREAKS GIDEON’S PROMISE  661 
BJS further concluded that only 27 percent of county-based 
public defender offices have an adequate number of attorneys to 
effectively manage their caseloads.5 
This has real consequences for defendants.  “Numerous 
studies that stretch from the 1980s to recent years show that 
public defenders meet with clients less quickly, file fewer 
motions, plea-bargain more often, and get charges dismissed less 
often than private attorneys.”6  However, since politicians 
receive little incentive from voters to reform the public defense 
system and increase public defender offices’ funding, these 
deficits continue to persist in jurisdictions.7  The absence of a 
political upside for lawmakers to increase funding may be the 
reason why Governor Cuomo of New York vetoed Bill 
S.8114/A.10706, a criminal justice reform bill that would have 
required New York State, rather than the individual counties, to 
provide funding for public defender office.8 
 
II. Background 
 
A. Before Gideon 
 
     a. English Common Law 
 
Until 1836, English common law held that although 
defendants in civil and misdemeanor criminal cases were 
entitled to counsel, those accused of treason or a felony were 
not.9  Proponents of the old rule argued that there was no need 
 
OF JUST. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/psc07st.pdf; LYNN LANGTON & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., U.S. 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007- STATISTICAL 
TABLES, Table 1 (Jun. 27, 2010), http://bjs.gov/content /pub/pdf/pdo07st.pdf. 
5.  LANGTON & FAROLE, supra note 4. 
6.  Lorelei Laird, Starved of Money for Too Long, Public Defender Offices 
are Suing—and Starting to Win, ABA J. (Jan. 2017), http://www.abajournal. 
com/magazine/article/the_gideon_revolution. 
7.  Id. 
8.  Jimmy Vielkind, Citing Cost, Cuomo Vetoes Indigent Legal Defense 
Bill, POLITICO (Dec. 31, 2016, 11:21 PM), http://www.politico.com/states/new-
york/albany/story/2016/12/citing-cost-cuomo-vetoes-indigent-legal-defense-
bill-108386.  
9.  Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932). 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/11
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for counsel, because the judge would ensure fairness and justice 
was served.10  The belief was that “the judge was impartial and 
looked with equal suspicion on both sides in a criminal 
action . . . .”11  However, many did not believe this was equitable, 
and sought change. 
 Many legal scholars vehemently believed this common law 
rule defied principles of justice.  Opponents of the rule, including 
Blackstone in 1758, argued that it was illogical to deny those 
accused of a felony the assistance of counsel, but assure those 
accused of petty crimes the right to retain counsel.12  The 
colonies opposed the rule as well.13  At least twelve of the 
thirteen colonies rejected the English common law rule and 
maintained that the right to counsel was generally recognized in 
all criminal cases.14 
 
b.    Initial Supreme Court Interpretations 
 
In 1932, the Supreme Court considered its first major 
criminal defense representation case in Powell v. Alabama.15  In 
Powell, a group of black men were charged with raping two white 
women.16  At the arraignments, the judge “appointed all 
members of the bar” for the defendants, apparently assuming 
that the counsel who represented them during arraignment 
would continue to do so during their trial.17  Each defendant was 
arraigned and pled not guilty.18  However, on the morning of the 
trial, the judge realized that none of the defendants had a lawyer 
to represent them.19  The judge asked if anyone would volunteer 
to represent the defendants, and a real estate attorney from 
 
10.  Id. at 61. 
11.  WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 11 
(1955). 
12.  Powell, 287 U.S. at 61.   
13.  Powell, 287 U.S. at 58. 
14.  Id. at 64-65 (noting that there were a few instances where the right 
to counsel was limited to capital punishment cases). 
15.   Bruce R. Jacob, Memories of and Reflections about Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 33 STETSON L. REV. 181, 188 (2003).  
16.  Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 49 (1932).  
17.  Id. at 49.  
18.  Id. at 49-50. 
19.  Id. at 57.  
3
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Tennessee offered to do so.20  A local attorney who had not tried 
a case in years offered to assist the Tennessee attorney.21  
Neither of the attorneys had knowledge of the facts of the case, 
or even their clients.22  Yet, the defense attorneys did not move 
to postpone the trial.23  The court then granted the prosecution’s 
request to severe the defendants into three different groups.24  
Each of the three groups of defendants had a jury trial that 
lasted one day.25  All of the defendants were found guilty of rape 
and sentenced to death.26 
The defendants appealed, arguing that their Fourteenth 
Amendment rights were violated, because “(1) They were not 
given a fair, impartial, and deliberate trial; (2) they were denied 
the right of counsel, with the accustomed incidents of 
consultation and opportunity of preparation for trial; and (3) 
they were tried before juries from which qualified members of 
their own race were systematically excluded.”27  The Supreme 
Court of Alabama affirmed the convictions.28 
The Supreme Court of the United States then granted a writ 
of certiorari.29  The Court decided that when a defendant in a 
capital case is not able to afford an attorney and is incapable of 
making his own defense, “it is the duty of the court, whether 
requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary 
requisite of due process of law[.]”30  The Court noted that the 
right to counsel is essential for even intelligent laymen.31  
Justice Sutherland noted that a defendant needs “the guiding 
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. 
Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of 
conviction because he does not know how to establish his 
 
20.  Powell v. Alabama, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS’N (2010), http:/ 
/www.nlada.net/library/article/na_powellvalabama [hereinafter   NLADA].  
21.  Id.  
22.  Id.  
23.  Id. 
24.  Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 49 (1932). 
25.  Id. at 50.  
26.  Id. 
27.  Id. 
28.  Id.   
29.  Powell v. Alabama, 286 U.S. 540, 540 (1932). 
30.  Powell, 287 U.S. at 71. 
31.  Id. at 69.  
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/11
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innocence.”32  With this decision, the Court established a 
criminal defendant’s right to counsel in a capital case. 
In Johnson v. Zerbst, the Supreme Court expanded the 
holding in Powell.33  In Johnson, the petitioner and another 
criminal defendant were “charged with feloniously uttering and 
passing four counterfeit twenty-dollar Federal Reserve notes 
and possessing twenty-one such notes” in Charleston, South 
Carolina.34  The defendants did not have an attorney to 
represent them and were unable obtain counsel.35  Throughout 
the course of one day, January 23, 1935, the defendants were 
notified of their indictment, arraigned, tried, convicted, and 
sentenced.36  During the arraignment, the defendants pled not 
guilty, and informed the Court that they did not have a lawyer, 
but that they were ready for trial.37  The two defendants had 
minimal education, lived in “distant cities of other states[,]” and 
had no family, friends, or acquaintances in Charleston.38  During 
the trial, the petitioner spoke with the District Attorney, not the 
Judge, and requested for the Judge to appoint counsel.39  The 
District Attorney explained to the petitioner that South Carolina 
trial courts do not appoint counsel unless the trial is for a capital 
crime.40 
After the defendants were sentenced, the petitioner 
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus.41  The United States 
District Court denied the petitioner habeas corpus, finding that 
even though the petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
was violated during his criminal trial, the petitioner was still not 
entitled to habeas corpus because the trial errors were 
insufficient to void the trial.42 
 
 
32.  Id. 
33.  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
34.  Id. at 459- 60. 
35.  Id. at 460. 
36.  Id.  
37.  Id.  
38.  Id.  
39.  Johnson, 304 U.S. at 460-61. 
40.  Id. at 461.  
41.  Bridwell v. Aderhold, 13 F. Supp. 253, 253 (N.D. Ga. 1935), aff’d sub 
nom. Johnson v. Zerbst, 92 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1937), rev’d, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).  
42.  Id. at 256.  
5
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The petitioner appealed the District Court’s denial of his 
writ of habeas corpus, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed the 
decision.43  The petitioner then petitioned for a writ of certiorari 
and the Supreme Court granted the petition.44  The Court held 
that the Sixth Amendment not only provided defendants in 
criminal cases with the right to counsel, but also required the 
federal courts to appoint counsel to indigent defendants in 
federal criminal court.45  Since the Court recognized the right to 
counsel under the Sixth Amendment, the Court’s holding did not 
apply to state courts.46 
However, in Betts v. Brady the Court considered whether 
state courts should be required to provide indigent defendants 
with counsel in non-capital cases.47  The Court concluded that 
the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, and the defendant’s constitutional 
guarantee to counsel only applied in federal courts.48  In 
reaching its holding, the Supreme Court noted that in the 
majority of states, citizens and their legislators have decided to 
forego requiring the courts to appoint counsel to defendants.49  
The Court held, “the appointment to counsel is not a 
fundamental right, essential to a fair trial[,]” but rather a matter 
of “legislative policy” for the states.50  The Court felt that because 
the states apply a wide range of policies regarding public 
criminal defense, the states should make the ultimate decision.51 
In the years between the Supreme Court’s decision in Betts 
v. Brady, and the decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme 
Court heard numerous cases where a defendant was convicted 
in a non-capital criminal state court without counsel.52  The 
Supreme Court recognized “special circumstances” in which the 
 
43.  Johnson v. Zerbst, 92 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1937), rev’d, 304 U.S. 458 
(1938).  
44.  Johnson v. Zerbst, 303 U.S. 629 (1938). 
45.  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938). 
46.  Jacob, supra note 15, at 191-92.  
47.  Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
48.  Id. at 461-62. 
49.  Id. at 471.  
50.  Id. at 471. 
51.  Id. at 471-72. 
52.  Jacob, supra note 15 at 194. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/11
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trial court was required to appoint counsel for a defendant.53  
The Supreme Court held that even “the mere existence of a 
serious criminal charge constituted in itself special 
circumstances requiring the services of counsel at trial.”54  Trial 
courts were required to consider the defendant’s “age, his 
educational background, his mental history, his prior experience 
in court, the complexity of the case, and the severity of the 
charges . . . before reaching a decision about the defendant’s 
request for a lawyer.”55  However, the Supreme Court still did 
not hold that a criminal defendant in state court had a 
constitutional right to counsel.56 
 
III. Gideon 
 
On June 3, 1961, the Bay Harbor Pool Room was broken into 
around 5:30 a.m.57  The intruder entered the Pool Room after 
breaking a window, and stole beer, wine, and coins from the 
jukebox and cigarette machines.58  Later that morning, Clarence 
Gideon was arrested and charged with breaking and entering 
with the intent to commit a misdemeanor.59  Under Florida state 
law, the crime was considered a felony.60 
Clarence Gideon resided in a rooming house across the 
street from the Pool Room, and had spent the most of his adult 
life in prison or jail on various robbery and larceny convictions.61  
Gideon could not afford a lawyer, was arraigned, and pled not 
guilty without assistance of counsel.62  When he requested an 
attorney from the Court, the trial judge stated that Florida law 
 
53.  Id. (emphasis added).  
54.  Id. at 194, n. 59 (quoting Gideon, 372 U.S. at 351). 
55.  Andrew Cohen, How Americans Lost the Right to Counsel, 50 Years 
After ‘Gideon’, ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/ 
archive/2013/03/how-americans-lost-the-right-to-counsel-50-years-after-
gideon/273433/. 
56.  Id. 
57.  Jacob, supra note 15, at 200. 
58.  Bruce R. Jacob, The Gideon Trials, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2059, 2060- 61 
(2014). 
59.  Id. 
60.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 336 (1963). 
61.  Jacob, supra note 15, at 185; Jacob, supra note 60, at 2061-63. 
62.  Jacob, supra note 60, at 2061. 
7
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did not require courts to assign a defendant an attorney, unless 
the defendant was charged with a capital offense.63  Gideon, 
however, argued that the “United States Supreme Court sa[id 
he was] entitled to be represented by Counsel.”64  The Court did 
not find Gideon’s argument to be convincing and refused to 
appoint him an attorney.65  This forced Gideon to take matters 
into his own hands. 
Gideon represented himself at trial.66  The Supreme Court 
characterized his performance as “about as well as could be 
expected from a layman.”67  Gideon was convicted by a jury and 
sentenced to five years of state imprisonment.68  Gideon filed a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Florida Supreme 
Court, arguing his conviction violated his constitutional rights.69  
The Florida Supreme Court denied Gideon’s petition for habeas 
corpus.70  However, this did not deter Gideon.  He sent a 
handwritten letter to the Supreme Court, claiming that his 
conviction was unconstitutional.71  The Supreme Court granted 
Gideon certiorari.72 
On March 18, 1963, Gideon’s persistence and faith in the 
United States Constitution proved to be successful.  The 
Supreme Court unanimously held that the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel is a fundamental right incorporated by the 
Fourteenth Amendment in all criminal proceedings, including 
those in state court.73  In reaching its holding, the Supreme 
Court expressly overturned Betts v. Brady, finding that the 
Supreme Court in Betts erred in holding that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel was not a fundamental right.74  The 
 
63.  Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337. 
64.  Id.  
65.  Id. 
66.  See generally Gideon, 372 U.S. 335. 
67.  Id. at 337. 
68.  Jacob, supra note 58, at 2080. 
69.  Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337. 
70.  Id. 
71.  Gideon v. Wainwright - Case Providing Defendants an Attorney - 
Turns 50, CBS Nᴇᴡs (Mar. 16, 2013, 1:32 PM), http://www.cbsnews 
.com/news/gideon-v-wainwright-case-providing-defendants-an-attorney-
turns-50/.  
72.  Gideon v. Cochran, 370 U.S. 908 (1962). 
73.  Gideon, 372 U.S. at 340. 
74.  Id. at 342. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/11
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majority opinion, written by Justice Hugo Black, expressed the 
belief that there was extensive precedent to support the holding 
that the right to counsel is a fundamental right protected under 
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.75  Justice 
Black wrote, “in our adversary system of criminal justice, any 
person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot 
be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.  This 
seems to us to be an obvious truth.”76 
 
IV. Downfall of Gideon 
 
A. Inadequate Defense 
 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s promise in Gideon has 
not been properly upheld in America’s courtrooms.  Today, 
“[i]ndigent defense continues to be the proverbial neglected child 
in the justice system.”77  Even though the unanimous Supreme 
Court expressed the belief that justice required effective counsel 
for both sides of the case, the burden of implementing this 
constitutional guarantee was placed on the states’ shoulders.78  
Many courts today fail to appoint attorneys to indigent 
defendants, even though they are constitutionally required to do 
so.79  On the fiftieth anniversary of Gideon’s landmark decision, 
the Assistant Attorney General of Florida, Bruce Jacob, who 
argued against Gideon in front of the Supreme Court, noted, 
“[o]ur system hasn’t performed as well as it should in fulfilling 
the promise of Gideon . . . [and] court legislatures have not gone 
as far as they should in implementing the provisions of the 
Gideon ruling.”80  The United States Attorney General Eric 
Holder stated in recent years that the American indigent 
 
75.  Id. at 341.  
76.  Id. at 344. 
77.  Anthony C. Thompson, The Promise of Gideon: Providing High-
Quality Public Defense in America, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 713, 713 (2013). 
78.  Id. 
79.  David Carroll, Gideon’s Despair, MARSHALL PROJECT, (Jan. 2, 2015, 
7:15 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/01/02/four-things-the-
next-attorney-general-needs-to-know-about-america-s-indigent-defense-
crisis#.YdNtzfcvB. 
80.  Gideon v. Wainwright- Case Providing Defendants an Attorney- Turns 
50, supra note 71. 
9
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criminal defense services “exist in a state of crisis.”81 
The dismal state of indigent criminal defense creates a 
ripple effect of negative consequences throughout the entire 
criminal justice system.82  In the immediate sense, insufficient 
criminal defense counsel can cause one of two consequences: (1) 
excessive delays within the courts, causing defendants to wait in 
jail for months at a time, or (2) “courts become assembly lines to 
process poor people into jail or prison without adequately sorting 
the guilty from the innocent.”83  According to Tanya Greene, an 
attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the 
insufficient number of public defenders is a main reason why 
ninety to ninety-five percent of indigent criminal defendants 
plead guilty.84 
 
B. Inadequate Funding 
 
The reasons for the crippling indigent defense system across 
the country are numerous, including the “crippling case 
overload, inadequate funding, and a pervasive, but false belief 
that efficiency and effectiveness are functional equivalents.”85  
Public defense offices nationwide have greater than 5,000 cases 
per year, and merely twelve percent of these cases had enough 
attorneys to handle the national caseload standard.86  This 
national standard recommends that public defenders should not 
represent more than “150 felony, 400 misdemeanor, 200 
juvenile, 200 mental health, or 25 appeals per year.”87  Moreover, 
approximately sixty percent of state-based public defender 
offices do not implement limits on the public defenders’ 
 
81.  Carroll, supra note 79. 
82.  Id. 
83.  Id. 
84.  Jaeah Lee et al., Charts: Why You’re in Deep Trouble if You Can’t 
Afford a Lawyer, MOTHER JONES (May 6, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www 
.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/public-defenders-gideon-supreme-court-
charts. 
85.  Thompson, supra note 77, at 713-14. 
86.  Zerline Hughes & Jason Fenster, Overloaded Public Defense Systems 
Result in More Prison Time, Less Justice, Jᴜsᴛ. Pᴏʟ’ʏ Iɴsᴛ. (July 27, 2011), 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/news/2757. 
87.  Hughes & Fenster, supra note 86.   
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/11
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caseloads.88  Tanya Greene of the ACLU explained that there are 
“so many cases, limited resources, and there’s no relief . . . . You 
go to work, you get more cases. You have to triage.”89  According 
to the Justice Department, United States public defender offices 
handled more than 5.5 million cases in 2007.90 
Public defender offices are “often lacking the political clout, 
independence, and legislative expertise to effectively navigate 
the appropriations process[.]”91  Public defenders have 
frequently remained quiet in public budget negotiations.92  
“Chief public defenders have chosen to fly under the radar in a 
presumed effort to protect their offices from public scrutiny that 
could induce governments to further reduce funding for the 
‘undeserving poor’ whom defender offices represent.”93  
However, the public defenders’ silence has done little to aid to 
their funding deficit.94 
Indigent defense offices encounter a great amount of 
difficulty in obtaining funding, especially since law enforcement 
and corrections agencies are considered by the public to be more 
essential to the state’s criminal justice role.95  In fact, the United 
States “spends less on public defense as a percentage per capita 
than every single European nation.”96  Moreover, in 2012, the 
federal government provided states with $287 million in grants, 
giving the states the discretion to choose how to allocate these 
monies to different criminal justice programs.97  However, the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) reported that law enforcement 
receives more than sixty percent of Edward Byrne Memorial 
 
88.  Lee et al., supra note 84. 
89.  Id. 
90.  Tina Peng, I’m a Public Defender. It’s Impossible for Me to do a Good 
Job Representing my Clients, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/opinions/our-public-defender-system-isnt-just-broken—
its-unconstitutional/2015/09/03/aadf2b6c-519b-11e5-9812-
92d5948a40f8_story.html?utm_term=.7fb12b180243. 
91.  Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Searching for Solutions to the Indigent Defense 
Crisis in the Broader Criminal Justice Reform Agenda, 122 YALE L.J. 2316, 
2322 (2013). 
92.  Thompson, supra note 77, at 720.  
93.  Id.  
94.  Id.  
95.  Fairfax, supra, note 91, at 2322.  
96.  Lee et al., supra note 84.  
97.  GIOVANNI & PATEL, supra note 2, at 4. 
11
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Justice Assistance Grant (JAG), the main source of federal 
justice funding for state and local jurisdictions.98  Of the small 
amount that is allocated to defenders and prosecutors, 
prosecutors receive seven times that of defenders.99  In fact, in 
2010, less than one percent of Byrne-JAG funds, merely $1.9 
million, were distributed to public defenders.100 
Furthermore, even though the costs associated with 
inadequate defense counsel, such as those concerning 
“incarceration, probation, and parole should now be apparent,” 
state legislators continuously neglect to use their political power 
to ensure ample funding is provided for the state’s criminal 
defense role.101  The executive director of the Justice Policy 
Institute (JPI) stated that: “For every $1 we spend on public 
defense, we are currently spending nearly $14 on corrections. We 
need to make smarter investments that will keep us safe and not 
empty our wallets.”102  Unfortunately, state legislators do not 
have any political pressure motivating them to increase funding 
for indigent criminal defense.103  The populations that are most 
affected by these legislators’ choices are those with little political 
power, the poor, and those accused of committing crimes.104 
 
 a. Reasons for Inadequate Funding 
 
        i. Fear of Those Accused of Crime 
 
Throughout history, United States citizens have 
consistently permitted individual rights to be encroached upon 
in the face of fear.105  Stringent anti-crime legislation and the 
media have helped create the societal view that those who 
commit crimes are dangerous and do not deserve to have their 
 
98.  Id. See also Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant 
Program, OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, https://www.bja.gov/jag/index.html (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2018). 
99.  GIOVANNI & PATEL, supra note 2, at 4. 
100.  Id. 
101.  Thompson, supra note 77, at 717. 
102.  Hughes & Fenster, supra note 86.  
103.  Thompson, supra note 77, at 717. 
104.  Id. 
105.  Id. at 714. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/11
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rights protected.106  Jonathan Rapping, public defense attorney 
and founder of Gideon’s Promise, notes: 
 
There is a view that public defenders represent 
people who commit the most heinous crimes. 
There’s a sense of, ‘Why would I fund a lawyer to 
help get a rapist or a murdererout of prison?’ . . . 
“Maybe they did something wrong. But it’s 
something relatively minor. And now they’re 
sitting in jail on a bond they can’t make, they’ve 
lost their housing, their job. For these mistakes, 
families are torn apart and communities are 
ruined.”107 
 
         ii. Mass Incarceration 
 
The United States has “about 5% of the world’s population 
but almost 25% of its prisoners, with the world’s largest number 
of inmates and highest per capita rate of incarceration.”108  As of 
2017, the United States had 2.2 million individuals incarcerated 
in jails or prisons.109  Almost sixty percent of incarcerated 
individuals are people of color, with black men being nearly six 
times more likely than white men to be incarcerated.110  In fact, 
one out of ten black men in their thirties is in jail or prison every 
day,111 and even more disturbing, one in every three black men 
will be in prison at some point in their lifetime.112 “[T]he reality 
is that today there are more African Americans under 
correctional control in prison or jail, on probation or parole, than 
 
106.  Id. at 714-15. 
107.  Lee et al., supra note 84.  
108. California’s Overcrowded Prisons, The Challenges of      
“Realignment,” ECONOMIST (May 19, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node 
/21555611.  
109.  Fact Sheet: Trends in U.S. Corrections, SENTENCING PROJECT 2, 
http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-
Corrections.pdf (last updated June 2017).  
110.  Id. at 5.  
111.  Id.  
112.  Id.; See also Bennett Capers, The Under-Policed, 51 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 589, 592 (2016). 
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were enslaved in 1850, a decade before the civil war began.”113 
The so-called War on Drugs has been deemed one of the 
main sources of the United States’ mass incarceration issues.  
Since the War on Drugs was first implemented in the 1980s, the 
number of people incarcerated for drug offenses has increased 
from approximately 41,000 in 1980 to almost 500,000 in 2014.114  
Moreover, the mandatory minimums imposed on drug crime 
sentences keep drug offenders in prison for greater periods of 
time.115  For example, in 1986, federal drug offense sentences 
had an average of twenty-two months in prison; however, federal 
drug offenders are now sentenced to prison for a period three 
times longer, with an average of sixty-two months in prison.116  
Additionally, the number of prisoners serving sentences of life 
without parole rose by more than 300 percent between 1992 and 
2009.117  Even more distressing is the number of incarcerated 
individuals serving life sentences, at one in every nine prisoners 
in 2013.118 
The increase in criminalization and criminal justice 
enforcement policies have contributed to the overcrowding of 
jails and prisons.119  The causes and effects of mass incarceration 
have created obstacles in fulfilling the Supreme Court’s promise 
in Gideon.120 
 
[T]hink of the process that leads to mass 
incarceration as a swift conveyor belt, whisking 
people from arrest to sentencing. First, increasing 
numbers of people, mostly poor, are dumped onto 
the conveyor belt. With no friction to slow it down, 
the conveyor belt whisks those people to the other 
 
113.   Sarah Childress, Michelle Alexander:” A System of Racial and Social 
Control”, FRONTLINE (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh 
/frontline/article/michelle-alexander-a-system-of-racial-and-social-control/.  
114.  Fact Sheet: Trends in U.S. Corrections, SENTENCING PROJECT 3, 
http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-
Corrections.pdf (last updated June 2017).  
115.  Id.  
116.  Id.  
117.  Capers, supra note 112, at 591. 
118.  Id.  
119.  Fairfax, supra note 91, at 2319.   
120.  Id.  
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/11
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end. Once there, those people are dumped into 
prison cells, where they are held for increasingly 
longer periods of time.121 
 
As more and more indigent defendants are dragged into the 
increasingly harsh criminal justice system, effective public 
defenders have become more essential than ever.122  The 
situation becomes even worse when prosecutors charge 
defendants with crimes that are “far higher than warranted by 
the facts of the case, and defenders often do not have time or 
resources to assertively negotiate with prosecutors in plea 
discussions”.123  Thus, many defendants accept unjust plea deals 
instead of risking going to trial.124  In 2013, more than ninety-
seven percent of criminal charges were resolved through plea 
bargains, with less than three percent going to trial.125  In fact, 
twenty percent of the 2.2 million incarcerated individuals in the 
United States “have yet to be found guilty of a crime.”126  
Accordingly, “addressing pretrial detention is significant to any 
effort to address the mass-incarceration problem, and providing 
poor people effective lawyers has a significant impact on these 
detention rates.”127 
 
C. Issues Concerning Indigent Defense Nationally 
 
Although the severity of the indigent defense crisis varies 
from state to state, public defenders are generally overworked 
and underfunded nationwide.128  A report generated by the 
Justice Policy Institute concluded that “73 percent of county-
based public defender offices lacked the requisite number of 
 
121.  Jonathan A. Rapping, Retuning Gideon’s Trumpet: Telling the Story 
in the Context of Today’s Criminal-Justice Crisis, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1225, 1227 
(2014).  
122.  Id. at 1228. 
123.  GIOVANNI & PATEL, supra note 2, at 1.  
124.  Id.  
125.  Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS 
(Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-
people-plead-guilty/.  
126.  Rapping, supra note 121, at 1236.  
127.   Id. at 1237. 
128.  Sara Mayeux, What Gideon Did, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 15, 19 (2016).  
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attorneys to meet caseload standards; 23 percent of these offices 
had less than half of the necessary attorneys to meet caseload 
standards[.]”129  The combination of the draconian sentencing 
requirements and plea deals have resulted in “even relatively 
well-funded public defenders hav[ing] little leverage in 
advocating for their clients.”130 
 
V. Indigent Defense in New York 
 
In 1965, the New York State Legislature adopted New York 
County Law Article 18-B.131  This law requires the individual 
sixty-two counties in New York to create their own funding plan 
for public defense services.132  Counties could choose between 
three options: (1) creating public defender offices; (2) contracting 
with a private legal aid society; or (3) creating a panel of private 
assigned counsel.133  The statute did not provide any means for 
oversight, or create a representation quality standard.134  In fact, 
in 1967, the New York State Bar Association (NYSBA) 
conducted a seminar to address the lack of standards to ensure 
quality representation, and “the lack of guidelines for 
determining an accused person’s eligibility for assigned counsel 
and for ancillary services, such as investigators and experts, the 
scope of representation, and the representation of minors.”135 
The county funding system in New York State has failed to 
become more effective over the years.  New York’s former Chief 
Judge Kaye referred to New York’s indigent defense system as 
“severely dysfunctional.”136  Believing that the New York’s 
system needed “[a] top-to-bottom reexamination[,]” Chief Judge 
Kaye formed the Commission on the Future of Indigent Defense 
 
129.  Hughes & Fenster, supra note 86.  
130.  Mayeux, supra note 128, at 19-20. 
131.  N.Y. Cᴛʏ. Lᴀᴡ § 722-b (McKinney 2012). 
132.  Id.  
133.  N.Y. CTY. LAW § 722 (McKinney 2012). 
134.  A History of Public Defense in New York State, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES 
UNION, https://www.nyclu.org/en/history-public-defense-new-york-state (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2018) [hereinafter NYCLU]. 
135.  Id. 
136.  The Editorial Board, A Big Victory for Public Defense in New York, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/24/opinion/a-
big-victory-for-public-defense-in-new-york.html.  
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/11
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Services.137  The Spangenberg Group contracts with the 
American Bar Association to conduct criminal justice research, 
and specializes in research concerning indigent defense 
services.138  The Spangenberg Group was hired by the Kaye 
Commission on the Future of Indigent Services to “examine the 
effectiveness of indigent criminal defense services across [New 
York] State.”139  The study conducted was, and still remains, “the 
most comprehensive study of indigent defense representation 
ever undertaken in New York State.”140  The study required the 
Spangenberg Group to travel to courtrooms in twenty-two 
counties, and meet with judges and lawyers.141  The final report 
indicated that New York’s indigent criminal defense system is 
“broken” and “is in a serious state of crisis.”142  Further, the final 
report indicated that New York’s funding system that allows the 
sixty-two counties to each create their own system, has 
numerous negative effects, including an absence of uniformity 
and oversight, as well as an “acute and chronic lack of 
funding.”143  Additionally, the final report stated that in many 
instances, defendants in minor misdemeanor and violations 
cases are not provided with assistance of counsel, in violation of 
their rights under the state and federal constitutions.144  Finally, 
the report concluded that it was the Commission’s opinion that 
“New York State is currently failing to provide a substantial 
number of indigent defendants with adequate and meaningful 
representation as required by the state and federal constitutions 
 
137.  Geoff Burkhart, Public Defense The New York Story, 30 CRIM. JUST., 
no. 3, 2015, at 25, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba 
/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_nystory.authche
ckdam.pdf 
138.  Marc Sackin, Note, Applying United States v. Stein to New York’s 
Indigent Defense Crisis Show the Poor Some Love Too, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 299, 
301 fn. 14 (2007). 
139.  Id. at 301.  
140.  Burkhart, supra note 137, at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
141.  Id.  
142.  THE SPANGENBERG GROUP ET AL., STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN 
NEW YORK: A STUDY FOR CHIEF JUDGE KAYE’S COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF 
INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES FINAL REPORT ii (2006),  https://www.nycourts. 
gov/ip/indigentdefense-
commission/IndigentDefenseCommission_report06.pdf. 
143.  Id. 
144.  Id. at iv. 
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and the laws of New York State.”145 
Moreover, the final report made several recommendations 
to address the ongoing issues present in New York’s insufficient 
indigent defense system.  The Commission first recommended 
for New York to create a statewide defender office in order to 
“insure accountability, enforceability of standards, and quality 
representation.”146  The Commission urged New York to address 
the disproportionate funding between prosecution offices and 
public defense offices.147  Further, the Commission 
recommended that the county funding system be “phased out,” 
and to instead have the “State’s General Fund” provide sufficient 
funding for indigent criminal defense.148  Finally, the 
Commission recommended that New York replace its county 
funding system with that of a state funded system within three 
years.149 
 
VI. New York Public Defense Reform Bill 
 
A. Hurrell-Harring Litigation 
 
In 2014, the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) 
published the report, State of Injustice: How New York State 
Turns its Back on the Right to Counsel for the Poor.150  The report 
evaluated the great disparity in funding between public defense 
offices and district attorney offices, including that in Onondaga 
County, which spent more than thirty-five times more money on 
prosecutors’ investigators, than public defenders’ 
 
145.  Id. at vi. 
146.  COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., FINAL REPORT TO 
THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK iii (2006), https://www.nycourts. 
gov/ip/indigentdefense-commission/IndigentDefenseCommission 
_report06.pdf. 
147.  Id. 
148.  Id. 
149.  Id.  
150.  NYCLU Report Exposes NY’s Failure to Provide Public Defense to 
Poor in Violation of Constitution, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Sept. 17, 2014), 
https://www.nyclu.org/en/press-releases/nyclu-report-exposes-nys-failure-
provide-public-defense-poor-violation-constitution [hereinafter NYCLU 
Report]. 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/11
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investigators.151  The report also revealed the lack of adequate 
representation by public defense offices, including that in 
Onondaga County, where “public defense attorneys consulted 
expert witnesses in only 22 of 14,000 cases and used 
investigators in only 50 cases.”152 
The information included in the NYCLU’s report was 
gathered from summary judgment filings in the Hurrell-Harring 
v. New York class action lawsuit brought by the NYCLU and law 
firm of Schulte, Roth & Zabel LLP in 2007.153  The suit 
challenged the inadequacy and constitutionality of New York’s 
indigent defense system, which placed the $262 million cost for 
public defense on the counties’ shoulders, and only provided 
counties with $62 million in support.154  The twenty plaintiffs in 
the class action were criminal defendants in Onondaga, Ontario, 
Schuyler, Suffolk, and Washington Counties who have 
experienced the lack of quality in their criminal defense 
representation.155  The lawsuit chose to focus on these five New 
York counties, not because they represented the worst indigent 
criminal defense in the state, but rather because they 
exemplified the three different funding methods available to 
counties under article 18-B, including “public defender (Schuyler 
and Washington Counties), assigned counsel (Onondaga and 
Ontario Counties), and contract counsel (Suffolk County).”156  
With regards to the lawsuit, Executive Director of the NYCLU, 
Donna Lieberman, stated, “Every day, in courtrooms throughout 
the state, New Yorkers are denied justice simply because they 
are poor.  Justice should not depend on your ZIP code or the size 
 
151.  Id.  
152.  Christopher Dunn, Op-Ed, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Feb. 1, 2017, 
12:30 PM), https://www.nyclu.org/en/taxonomy/term/108?page=4. 
153. Settlement Begins Historic Reformation of Public Defense in New 
York State, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 21, 2014), https://www.nyclu. 
org/en/press-releases/settlement-begins-historic-reformation-public-defense-
new-york-state. 
154.  New York State Failing Its Constitutional Duty on Public Defense, 
NYCLU Lawsuit Charges, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Nov. 8, 2007), 
https://www.nyclu.org/en/press-releases/new-york-state-failing-its-
constitutional-duty-public-defense-nyclu-lawsuit-charges [hereinafter NYCL 
U Files Suit]. 
155.  Id. See also, Burkhart, supra note 137, at 26-27.  
156.  Burkhart, supra note 137, at 27. 
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of your wallet.”157 
In 2009, the New York Appellate Division dismissed the 
case, finding that any relief, if justified, should come from the 
legislature and not the courts, since none of the plaintiffs were 
seeking relief for their convictions.158  In 2010, the New York 
Court of Appeals reversed the decision, finding that the 
complaint correctly stated a claim for relief for constitutional 
violations of the guarantees established in Gideon.159  In 2014, 
the DOJ filed a Statement of Interest, comparable to an amicus 
brief.160  In their Statement of Interest, the DOJ did not reveal 
its position on the merits of the case, but instead aimed to “assist 
the Court in assessing whether the State of New York has 
‘constructively’ denied counsel to indigent defendants during 
criminal proceedings.”161  The DOJ’s Statement of Interest was 
groundbreaking because it marked the first time that the DOJ 
expressed support for public defense in a state court case.162 
On October 21, 2014, after seven years of litigation and less 
than one month after the DOJ filed their statement of interest, 
the parties agreed to settle.163  The 2014 settlement agreement 
required New York to reform, “focusing on the five New York 
counties—Ontario, Onondaga [], Schuyler, Suffolk and 
Washington[.]”164  The agreement will last seven and one-half 
years, subject to court approval.165  Associate Legal Director of 
the NYCLU, Christopher Dunn, stated “[t]his settlement marks 
what we hope and expect to be the beginning of sweeping 
reforms of New York’s broken public defense system.”166  Among 
several other provisions, New York is required to hire enough 
 
157.  NYCLU Files Suit, supra note 154. 
158.  See Hurrell-Harring v. New York, 883 N.Y.S.2d 349 (App. Div. 2009). 
159.  See Hurrell-Harring v. New York, 904 N.Y.S.2d 296 (2010). 
160.  Burkhart, supra note 137, at 27.  
161.  Statement of Interest of the United States at 1, Hurrell-Harring v. 
New York, 866 N.Y.S.2d 92 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (No. 8866-07), www.justice. 
gov/file/65011/download. See also, Burkhart, supra note 137, at 27.  
162.  Burkhart, supra note 137, at 27. 
163.  Id. 
164.  Settlement Begins Historic Reformation of Public Defense in New 
York State, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 21, 2014), https://www.nyclu. 
org/en/press-releases/settlement-begins-historic-reformation-public-defense-
new-york-state [hereinafter NYCLU Settlement]. 
165.  Id. 
166.  Id. 
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lawyers, investigators, and support staff to guarantee that “all 
poor criminal defendants have lawyers with the time and 
support necessary to vigorously represent the defendant.”167  
The state is also required to increase the Office of Indigent Legal 
Service’s ability to conduct state-level oversight to ensure that 
the constitutional requirement of quality indigent public defense 
is fulfilled.168  Finally, the settlement established a new 
threshold for determining whether a defendant qualifies for 
public defense services.169  This new threshold is set at “250 
percent of the federal poverty limit[,]” rather than permit 
counties to set their own thresholds.170  William J. Leahy, head 
of the Office of Indigent Legal Service, stated that this 
settlement “marks the very first time that the state has stood up 
and acknowledged that it is a state’s responsibility to comply 
with the Gideon mandate. It is a state responsibility, not a 
county responsibility.”171 
 
B. Proposed Public Defender Reform Bill 
 
Despite the Hurrell-Harring settlement and the Kaye-
Commission report, the New York State Legislature has failed 
to create a statewide funding system.  The closest the state has 
come to implementing a statewide funding system was Bill 
S.8114/A.10706, which was passed unanimously by each 
chamber of the state legislature in June of 2016.172  This public 
defender reform bill was sponsored by Senator John 
DeFrancisco and Assembly Member Patricia Fahy,173 and had 
 
167.  Id. 
168.  Id. 
169.  Jimmy Vielkind, Groups Urge Cuomo to Sign Indigent Defense Bill 
Amid Worries Over Cost, POLITICO (Dec. 14, 2016, 5:26 AM), http://www. 
politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2016/12/groups-urge-cuomo-to-sign-
indigent-defense-bill-amid-cost-worries-108067. 
170.  Id. 
171.  Burkhart, supra note 137, at 28 (quoting Indigent Legal Services:A 
Discussion with William Leahy, AMICI (2015), www.nycourts.gov/admin/ 
amici/). 
172.  S. 8114, 114th Cong. (2016) (enacted). See also John Stashenko, 
Long-Sought Indigent Defense Bill Goes to Governor’s Desk, N.Y.L.J. (Dec. 21, 
2016, 6:02 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/12027753385 
58/. 
173.  Id. 
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support from numerous groups, including veteran organizations, 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP), and county government leaders.174  In an effort to 
meet the constitutional mandate under Gideon, the bill would 
place the responsibility of funding public defense on New York 
State, and would be completely implemented by 2023.175  Under 
the public defender reform bill, the Office of Indigent Legal 
Services would be authorized to establish and uphold standards 
of effective legal representation for indigent defendants.176  The 
bill would extend the public defense reform that has been 
initiated for the five counties in the Hurrell-Harring settlement 
agreement to all of the counties in New York. 
Unfortunately, Governor Cuomo vetoed the bi-partisan bill 
at the last minute on New Year’s Eve 2016.177  In his veto 
message, Governor Cuomo stated, “This bill would do little more 
than transfer to the taxpayers of this state an entirely new 
obligation to pay for any and all existing expenses related to 
general defense legal work, far beyond legal representation of 
indigent criminal defendants.”178  Governor Cuomo believed that 
the legislators included over $800 million in legal aid costs that 
were not related to criminal defense, and instead involved family 
court and other courtrooms.179  Governor Cuomo asserted that 
this bill was not truly an indigent defense bill, but instead was 
merely an “attempt to shift costs from the counties to the state 
taxpayers under the guise of indigent defense.”180  However, 
Governor Cuomo pledged to introduce his own proposal on how 
 
174.  Vielkind, supra note 169.  
175.  News Release Assembly Speaker Carl E. Heastie State Legislature 
Passes Measure to Address Disparities in New York’s Justice System, N.Y. ST. 
ASSEMBLY (June 17, 2016), http://nyassembly.gov/Press/20160617a/.  
176.  Id.  
177.  The Editorial Board, New York’s Unequal Justice for the Poor, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/05/opinion/new-yorks-
unequal-justice-for-the-poor.html.  
178.  Jimmy Vielkind, Citing Cost, Cuomo Vetoes Indigent Legal Defense 
Bill, POLITICO (Dec. 31, 2016, 11:21 PM), https://www.politico.com/states/new-
york/albany/story/2016/12/citing-cost-cuomo-vetoes-indigent-legal-defense-
bill-108386. 
179.  Id.  
180.  Matthew Hamilton, Gov. Cuomo Vetoes Legal Services Bill, TIMES 
UNION (Jan. 1, 2017), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Gov-Cuomo-
vetoes-legal-services-bill-10829111.php.  
22https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/11
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to handle New York’s indigent defense system and the Hurrell-
Harring settlement.181 
Not surprisingly, the proponents of the public defender 
reform bill were disappointed in Governor Cuomo’s decision.  
Many of the proponents could not understand why Governor 
Cuomo would agree to the Hurrell-Harring settlement for only 
five counties and refuse to extend the agreement to the 
remaining fifty-eight counties with this bill.  The Senate Deputy 
Majority Leader, John DeFransisco, a Republican, asserted that 
Governor Cuomo should not have been surprised by the cost, 
especially since “[t]his bill passe[d] six months ago . . . It made 
no sense in the [Hurrell-Harring] settlement to make more 
people eligible . . .  and then say it’s too costly.”182  Senator 
DeFransisco further argued “What about the other counties – 
are they chump change or do they have to go ahead and bring a 
lawsuit and settle with the governor for the same amount?”183  
Donna Lieberman, the NYCLU Executive Director, noted, “We 
are deeply disappointed that the governor has vetoed the most 
important criminal justice reform legislation in memory.”184  
Additionally, the New York State Bar Association expressed 
their disappointment in Governor Cuomo’s veto of the public 
defense reform bill.185  The New York State Bar Association 
further criticized Governor Cuomo’s proposal to fund the 2017 
increase in county expenditures for public defense services, by 
increasing the Biennial Attorney Registration Fee by fifty 
dollars, rather than using the state’s General Fund to satisfy the 
 
181.  Vielkind, supra note 8. 
182.  Jimmy Vielkind, Legal Defense Bill Remains in Limbo After Failed 
Special Session Plan, POLITICO (Dec. 20, 2016, 5:14 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2016/12/after-
consideration-in-special-talks-legal-defense-bill-still-in-limbo-108371. 
183.   Jimmy Vielkind, Group Urges Cuomo to Sign Indigent Defense Bill 
Amid Worries Over Cost, POLITICO (Dec. 14, 2016, 5:26 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2016/12/groups-urge-
cuomo-to-sign-indigent-defense-bill-amid-cost-worries-108067.  
184.  Kenneth Lovett, Cuomo Vetoes Bill Requiring N.Y. to Fund Legal 
Services for Poor, N.Y. Dᴀɪ ʟ ʏ  Nᴇᴡs (Jan. 1, 2017, 12:42 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/cuomo-vetoes-bill-requiring-n-y-
fund-legal-services-poor-article-1.2930833. 
185.  Claire P. Gutekunst, The Imperative to Protect Human Rights and 
the Rule of Law, N.Y. ST. BAR ASS’N J., Feb. 2017 at 5.  
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constitutional mandate under Gideon.186  Overall, Governor 
Cuomo’s 2017 budget provisions regarding New York’s criminal 
justice system were not well received by many. 
 
C. What Should the New Reform Legislation Look Like? 
 
As previously stated, although Governor Cuomo vetoed the 
public defender reform bill, he pledged to pass a new bill that 
would ensure the constitutional mandates of Gideon are upheld.  
There is an abundant amount of research to guide New York 
State’s lawmakers to enact a statute that would ensure every 
criminal defendant receives a quality legal representation, 
regardless of their ability to pay.  Scholars have provided various 
methods that could be implemented to address the problems 
plaguing public defender offices.  Three different reform 
proposals include, “(1) public defender programs that employ 
full- or part-time counsel; (2) a contract system, where 
individuals or firms engage in a contract to provide 
representation for a number of indigent defendants; and (3) an 
assigned counsel system, where courts appoint attorneys to 
handle individual cases.”187 
Not only is there a large amount of scholarship on the 
subject, but New York can learn from reform efforts in other 
states as well.  Recent phenomena and public discourse have led 
to many reform efforts throughout the nation.  The increased 
attention to mass incarceration has acted as a catalyst for 
indigent defense reform efforts.188  In 2013, the Office for Access 
to Justice, which works with federal, state, and local officials to 
permit indigent citizens greater access to effective counsel, 
“issued $6.7 million in federal grants designed to improve 
indigent criminal defense services.”189  Additionally, Utah 
passed a bill in March of 2016, which created a commission to 
oversee indigent defense, and will include state funding for the 
first time, leaving Pennsylvania as the only state not providing 
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any funding for indigent defense.190 
Even though the majority of states currently fund at least 
ninety percent or more of their public defense system,191 the 
manner in which each state provides this funding varies 
greatly.192  “There is a disturbing lack of consistency in the 
amounts allocated to indigent defense and the services or cases 
to which that funding is linked.”193  In the ABA’s 1992 Standards 
for Criminal Justice, the ABA noted that “it [is] preferable to 
create a statewide system of defense,” emphasizing that state 
programs “have shown their ability to grow and change with the 
times while maintaining financial stability.”194  Efforts to reform 
funding for indigent defense systems should make sure that 
there is “meaningful oversight of defense counsel.”195  This 
“meaningful oversight” must concentrate on whether defense 
counsel represents the defendants zealously and through a 
client-centered approach.196 
It seems as though Governor Cuomo may have taken this 
scholarship into consideration when he proposed his own plan to 
address New York’s indigent defense system through the 2017-
2018 budget, signed on April 8, 2017.197  The budget includes a 
six-year plan to improve indigent public defense; however, it 
does not encompass the entire $450 million cost necessary to 
provide effective counsel as required by Gideon.198  Rather, the 
budget calls for the state to compensate counties for the cost of 
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implementing the improvements established in the Hurrell-
Harring settlement.199  These improvements include requiring 
the state’s Office of Indigent Legal Services to create and 
implement standards for public defense concerning “presence of 
counsel at a criminal defendant’s first court appearance; 
reasonable limits on the caseloads public defense attorneys can 
carry; proper training, supervision, and support staff for 
attorneys; and access to resources needed to mount an effective 
defense.”200  By the year 2023, the state is expected to provide 
counties with $250 million each year for indigent defense.201 
While many of these trends in legislation and policy seem to 
be heading in the direction of an improved indigent criminal 
defense system, not only in New York, but across the United 
States, there are still many obstacles in the way.  To be sure, 
there are still many who are doubtful that real change will 
result.202  William Leahy, director of the NYS Office of Indigent 
Legal Services believes “This [six year plan] is less than whole, 
but it is what I have been saying since the day after the Hurrell-
Harring settlement was signed, that the state has to make sure 
that all counties are in compliance with the [C]onstitution.”203  
Further, the executive director of New York State Defenders 
Association, Jonathan Gradess, expressed, “I don’t think it’s 
going to be enough, but it moves us in the direction of maturely 
looking at the system.”204  Those who have doubts about the 
effectiveness of this budget plan have reason to be skeptical.  Not 
only does this budget plan fail to cover the entire $450 million 
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cost of indigent defense, but some of the states who previously  
passed public defense reform legislation have still failed to 
adequately fund their systems.  For example, Mississippi 
enacted reform legislation in 1998, “only to repeal [it] a few years 
later when funding had still not materialized.”205  Other states 
have cut funding for indigent defense after passing legislation 
meant to help increase funding.  In Montana, the state’s 
allocation for indigent criminal defense in the budget has fallen 
more than $3 million dollars behind the state’s original funding 
goal.206  While efforts have been made to address the crisis, it is 
far from being completely remedied. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
It has been over fifty years since the Supreme Court held in 
Gideon that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to 
counsel, regardless of their socioeconomic status.  Yet, New York 
State has largely failed to satisfy this constitutional 
requirement.  The state’s failure not only delegitimizes its legal 
system, but has profound detrimental effects on indigent 
criminal defendants and their loved ones.  As Corey Stoughton, 
NYCLU Senior Staff and lead counsel on the Hurrell-
Harring case, stated, “Our criminal justice system only works at 
producing the truth if both the prosecution and the defense are 
on equal footing.  In much of New York State, the system is 
broken.”207  Until New York State replaces their county funded 
indigent criminal defense system with a state funded system 
and provides meaningful oversight, indigent criminal 
defendants will continue to have their constitutional rights 
violated.  Governor Cuomo had the chance to ensure significant 
change occurred.  However, he floundered this opportunity.  One 
can only hope that New York’s legislators will hold him to his 
word and ensure that Gideon’s promise is fulfilled. 
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